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1 Introduction
The rationing problem is arguably the simplest model of distributive justice.
The problem involves a resource that is to be divided among individuals each
of whom submit a claim for the resource. Rationing is required when the sum
of the claims exceeds the resource, with typical examples being bankruptcy,
taxation, inheritance, etc. The problem of rationing is as old as the history
of civilization itself. We can nd examples of such problems in ancient texts
such as the Talmud and Aristotle. The rst formal analysis of the rationing
problem was presented by ONeill (1982) where he describes the resource as an
inheritance. The problem of rationing is an ethical or normative issue since
neither the market nor traditional institutions can provide convincing solutions.
For this reason, adopting an axiomatic approach has been the focus of the
literature on rationing.
The most natural rule in this context probably arises from Aristotles maxim,
Equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally, in proportion to rel-
evant similarities and di¤erencesfrom Nicomachean Ethics. The proportional
rule gives shares in proportion to claims. There are various normative treat-
ments of the Proportional rule, such as ONeill (1982), Moulin (1987), Chun
(1988), Young (1988), and Ju et al. (2007), etc.
Other rules central to the literature are based on normative axioms, including
various forms of egalitarianism. The uniform gains rule equalizes the shares
such as the shares do not exceed the claims. The uniform losses rule equalizes
the losses (di¤erence between claim and share) to the extent that it is possible.
One can refer to some axiomatic characterizations of egalitarian rules for di¤er-
ent environments in Dagan (1996), Herrero and Villar (2001), Sprumont (1991),
Kesten (2006), Juarez and Kumar (2013), etc. Young (1987a) characterizes
a class of parametric rules in the taxation problem and Young (1987b) intro-
duces another important family of rules called the equal sacrice rules. Rules
from ancient texts and their extensions have also been considered by various
authors. Aumann and Maschler (1985) provides a rule from the Talmud in the
bankruptcy context, and papers like Hokari and Thomson (2003) study gener-
alizations of the same. Alcalde, Marco, and Silva (2005) extends an old solution
for bankruptcy problems described by Ibn Ezra in the 12th century. Surveys of
rationing problems are provided by Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003, 2013)
where interesting characterizations of rationing rules are mentioned.
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We consider the rationing problem in a two-stage setting where the claims are
state contingent. In the rst stage, each individual submits a claim for every
possible state of the world. The realization of the state happens in the second
stage. A rule must distribute the resources in the rst stage, i.e., before the
realization of the state of the world. Such a situation may arise, for instance,
in the allocation of the scal budget of a country. Di¤erent departments of a
government may require di¤erent resources in di¤erent states of the world to
be realized in the coming scal year. For example, the Department of Defense
may have di¤erent requirements depending on its relations with neighboring
countries in the following year. The Department of Agriculture has requirements
based on factors like rainfall next year. The Department of Health may have
requirements that depend on factors like the incidence of epidemics and the
weather. However, the federal budget must be allocated at the beginning of the
scal year.
Another example of our setting is the distribution of research funds (or travel
grants) among graduate students of a department in a university who expect
travel or research expenses contingent on the state of the world (e.g., expenses
based on the results of their research, travels based on the conferences accepting
their paper, etc.). A situation like our setting also arises in the allocation of
university funds among di¤erent departments based on their performance, or
need, or NSF funds to researchers from various universities.
This natural framework of two-stage, state-contingent rationing problem has
not been given much consideration in the literature. A fairly close setting called
multi-issue allocations (MIA), introduced in Calleja et al. (2005), has been
studied. In MIA, the claim of each individual is a vector that species the
amount claimed on each issue and a rule distributes shares for each issue and
each individual. Bergantiños et al. (2011), and Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2010)
provide several axiomatic characterizations of uniform gains and uniform losses
rules in MIA whereas Moreno-Ternero (2009), and Bergantiños et al. (2010)
provide axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule in MIA. The MIA
framework, however, does not consider uncertainty.
A similar framework to ours that considers uncertainty has been analyzed by
Habis and Herings (2013). They focus on the stability1 of the stochastic ex-
1They used Weak Sequential Core as the stability criterion which was dened in Habis
and Herings (2011).
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tensions of various rationing rules and show that the only stable rule is the
stochastic extension of the uniform gains rule. Xue (2015) studies the egalitar-
ian rule for the pre-committed division of a perfectly divisible commodity where
the claims are uncertain. Chun and Thomson (1990a and 1990b) study the bar-
gaining problem with uncertain disagreement points. Although the bargaining
problem and the rationing framework are similar, they di¤er in the following
sense. Bargaining theory deals with feasible sets that are arbitrarily convex
and compact sets as opposed to being the comprehensive hull of subsets of a
hyperplane normal to a vector of ones.
In our two-stage framework, the individuals submit their claims in the rst stage
and realization of the state happens in the second stage. The resource must be
allocated in the rst stage. Two particularly natural approaches arise in such
situations. The rst approach is to apply a rationing rule on the expectation of
the claims, which we call the ex-ante rationing rule. In the second approach,
we rst use a rationing rule to nd the shares of every individual for each state
based on the claim prole in that state. Then the nal shares are calculated by
taking the expectation of the shares over states. We call this rule the ex-post
rationing rule.
In this paper, we will focus our attention on proportional rules and characterize
both the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. Our ax-
iomatic characterizations are based on the No Advantageous Reallocation axiom
introduced by Moulin (1985). This axiom states that no group of individuals can
benet from reallocating their claims amongst themselves. We extend this con-
cept to our state contingent framework by introducing two nonmanipulability
conditions.
The rst extension which we call No Advantageous Reallocation across Indi-
viduals (NARAI ) requires that no group of individuals benets if transfers are
allowed within a state. The next extension considers transfers across states
which we call No Advantageous Reallocation across States (NARAS ). We also
use the axioms of Anonymity (AN ), Symmetry (SYM ), Continuity (CONT ), No
Award for Null (NAN ), and Independence (IND). The AN axiom says that the
rule should not di¤erentiate between individuals according to their names. The
SYM axiom requires that the names of the states do not matter. The CONT
axiom states that the rule should be a continuous function in its arguments.
The NAN axiom says that individuals with zero claims in all states should be
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allocated zero amount. The IND axiom says that if we mix two lotteries2 with a
third one, then the rationing rule associated with these two mixed lotteries does
not depend on the third lottery used. We show that the ex-ante proportional
rule is the only rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS whereas the
ex-post proportional rule is characterized by NARAI, CONT, NAN, SYM, and
IND.
Another important aspect of this problem is to compare the shares allocated by
the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. We compare
shares given by the ex-ante and ex-post proportional rules for various distribu-
tions of claims and nd su¢ cient conditions under which a particular individual
will be favoured by one rule compared to the other. In particular we nd that
an individual with a deterministic claim always prefers the ex-post proportional
rule over the ex-ante proportional rule.
In Section 2, we introduce the preliminaries. Section 3 presents the comparison
between the ex-ante and the ex-post proportional rules. In Section 4, we provide
our characterization results, and Section 5 concludes with some directions for
future research.
2 Preliminaries
In the state-contingent claims framework, a rationing problem is dened as
(N;S; x; p; t) where N is a nite set of individuals and S is a nite set of the
states of the world.3 The state contingent claim matrix x 2 RNS+ represents the
claims of individuals in various states, where xis denotes the claim of individual
i in state s. The probabilities of states is denoted by common prior p 2 jSj 1
and t  0 is the resource to be shared among the individuals.4 It is assumed thatP
i2N
xis t for all s 2 S. Throughout the paper, we consider a xed population
N and a xed set S of states. For the sake of brevity, we denote our problem
2By lottery we mean probability distribution over states of the world to be realized in the
stage two.
3The standard rationing problem is dened as (N; x; t) where N is a nite set of agents, x
is a claim vector x = (xi)i2N  0 such that
P
i2N
xi t and t  0 is the resource to be shared
among the agents. A rationing rule ' assigns a vector of shares '(N; x; t) 2 RN+ to every
rationing problem such that
P
i2N
'i(N; x; t) = t.
4jSj 1 denotes a jSj   1 dimensional simplex.
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(x; p; t). A non-empty set of problems is called a domain and is denoted by D.5
A rationing rule ' : D ! RN+ gives a vector of shares such that
P
i2N
'i(x; p; t) = t.
Our main characterization results are obtained for rich domains which we dene
as follows:
Denition 1 A domain D is rich if for all x; x0 2 RNS+ , for all s 2 S, for all
p 2 jSj 1, for all t  0 with xNs = x0Ns6 , then f(x; p; t) 2 D )(x0; p; t) 2 Dg.
Now we will dene two rationing rules which involve the proportionality idea.
Because our rules are based on proportionality idea, let us recall the standard
proportional rule when we restrict our attention to just one state s 2 S. Let us
denote xjs = (x1s; x2s; :::; xjN js) 2 RN+ as the vector of claims of individuals in
state s 2 S.
The proportional rule ( prs) at state s is dened as a function prs : RN+ R+ !
R+ where,
prsi (xjs; t) =
xis
xNs
t, for all i 2 N .
The ex-ante proportional rule ( pr) is dened by applying the proportional rule
to the expectation of the state contingent claims.
pri(x; p; t) :=
P
s2S
(psxis)P
j2N
P
s2S
(psxjs)
t =
P
s2S
(psxis)P
s2S
(psxNs)
t, for all i 2 N .
The ex-post proportional rule ( epr) is dened by expectation of the shares found
by applying the proportional rule on the state contingent claims.
epri(x; p; t) :=X
s2S

ps
xis
xNs

t, for all i 2 N .
The illustration of the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional
rule for a simple economy with two people and two states is presented in Figure
1.
5More precisely this is a restricted domain of problems where N and S are xed so a better
notation would be D(N;S): However, for notational simplicity we use D since it does not raise
any confusion.
6We use the notation xTs :=
P
i2T (xis), where T  N:
6
Figure 1: The ex-ante vs. the ex-post proportional rule
As shown in Figure 1, the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional
rule do not necessarily coincide. Therefore it would be interesting to know the
conditions under which the shares according to two rules di¤er. For example,
we would like to investigate which individuals prefer one rule over another. In
the next section we will provide various comparisons between these two rules.
3 Comparisons
As we just witnessed, the shares allocated by the two rules can be di¤erent.
These rules coincide only in special cases of state probabilities and claim vectors.
In the following proposition we provide a general expression for the di¤erence
in shares by the two rules.
Proposition 1 Let (x; p; t) 2 D be given. Further assume that x 2 RNS++ .
The di¤erence between the shares of an individual i 2 N given by the ex-ante
proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule is the following
pri(x; p; t)  epri(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
"
psxis
 
1  ps 
P
j2N
xjs
xis
P
r 6=s
prxir
xNr
!#
P
s2S
(psxNs)
t.
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Proof. Dene js =
xjs
xis
for all j 2 N and for all s 2 S.
So the ex-ante proportional rule for individual i is given by
pri(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
(psxis)P
s2S
(psxNs)
t =
P
s2S
(psxis)P
s2S
(psxisNs)
t.
And the ex-post proportional rule for individual i is given byepri(x; p; t) = P
s2S

ps
xis
xNs

t =
P
s2S
ps
Ns
t.
So the di¤erence between the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post propor-
tional rule is
pri(x; p; t)  epri(x; p; t) = Ps2S(psxis)P
s2S
(psxisNs)
t  P
s2S
ps
Ns
t =
=
P
s2S
(psxis)
Q
s2S
Ns 
P
s2S
(psxisNs)
Q
s2S
Ns
P
s2S
ps
NsQ
s2S
Ns
P
s2S
(psxisNs)
t =
=
Q
s2S
Ns
" P
s2S
(psxis) 
P
s2S
[psxisNs]
P
s2S
ps
Ns
#
Q
s2S
Ns
P
s2S
(psxisNs)
t =
=
P
s2S
[(ps p2s)xis] 
P
s2S
(psxisNs)
P
r 6=s
pr
NrP
s2S
(psxisNs)
t =
P
s2S
"
psxis
 
1 ps 
P
j2N
js
P
r 6=s
pr
Nr
!#
P
s2S
(psxisNs)
t =
P
s2S
"
psxis
 
1 ps 
P
j2N
xjs
xis
P
r 6=s
prxir
xNr
!#
P
s2S
(psxNs)
t:
We use this expression for two-state and two-individual scenario in the following
example to illustrate the conditions on claim vectors such that these two rules
coincide.
Example 1 For jN j = jSj = 2 and p1 = p2 = 12 , we have
pr1(x; p; t)  epr1(x; p; t) = x11x12
h
(x22x12   x21x11 )(x11 + x21   (x12 + x22))
i
2(x12 + x22)(x11 + x21)(x11 + x21 + x12 + x22)
t.
For jN j = 2, both rules give identical shares when the sum of the claims is equal
for each state (Figure 2) or the ratio of the claims for each state is equal (Figure
3).
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Figure 2: The sum of the claims for each
state is equal: xN1 = xN2
Figure 3: The ratio of the claims for each
state is equal: x11x21 =
x12
x22
The next proposition will illustrate that if an individual has a deterministic
claim, then he would prefer the ex-post proportional rule over the ex-ante pro-
portional rule. Conversely, the ex-ante proportional rule protects an individual
whose claim distribution has a higher spread.
Proposition 2 For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all i 2 N , If xis = c  0 for all
s 2 S, then epri(x; p; t)  pri(x; p; t).
Proof. epri(x; p; t) pri(x; p; t) = P
s2S

ps
c
xNs

t 
P
s2S
(psc)P
s2S
(psxNs)
t =
 P
s2S
ps
xNs
  1P
s2S
(psxNs)
!
ct =
P
s2S
p2s+
P
s 6=t

pspt

xNs
xNt
+
xNt
xNs

 1P
s2S
(psxNs)
ct =
1 2 P
s 6=t
(pspt)+
P
s 6=t

pspt

xNs
xNt
+
xNt
xNs

 1P
s2S
(psxNs)
ct =
=
P
s 6=t

pspt

xNs
xNt
+
xNt
xNs

 2

P
s2S
(psxNs)
ct =
P
s 6=t

pspt
(xNs xNt)2
xNsxNt

P
s2S
(psxNs)
ct  0.
4 Characterizations
In this section we introduce some axioms and we use them to characterize the
rules we have discussed above.
Continuity (CONT): For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all sequences (xk; pk; tk) 2 D,
if (xk; pk; tk)! (x; p; t), then '(xk; pk; tk)! '(x; p; t).
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Continuity tells us that small changes in the parameters of the problem do not
bring big jumps in the shares. Continuity is desirable because we do not want
small errors (e.g., measurement errors) to lead to big changes in the shares.
Anonymity (AN): For all (x; p; t) 2 D, for all permutations  : N ! N; and for
all i 2 N , 'i(x; p; t) = '(i)(x; p; t); where xis = x(i)s:
Anonymity says that the names of the individuals do not matter. This is a very
natural axiom and is central to the literature on fairness.
Symmetry (SYM): For all (x; p; t) 2 D, for all permutations  : S ! S; and for
all i 2 N , 'i(x; p; t) = 'i(x; p; t); where xis = xi(s) and ps = p(s).
Symmetry is similar to the Anonymity Axiom with the role of individuals being
substituted by states. It says that the names of the states do not matter.
No Award for Null Players (NAN): For all (x; p; t) 2 D and for all i 2 N , if
xis = 0 for all s 2 S, then 'i(x; p; t) = 0.
No Award for Null Players Axiom says that an individual with zero claim for
each state should get zero share. This axiom is also called the Dummy axiom
or Null axiom in the literature.
Moulin (1985) dened the No Advantageous Reallocation axiom to characterize
the egalitarian and the utilitarian solutions in quasi-linear social choice prob-
lems. We will dene two axioms on invariance to reallocation in a similar manner
where transfers are made either across individuals or across states.
No Advantageous Reallocation across Individuals (NARAI): For all (x; p; t); (x0;
p; t) 2 D and for all i 2 N , if P
j2Nnfig
xjs =
P
j2Nnfig
x0js and xis = x
0
is for all
s 2 S, then 'i(x; p; t) = 'i(x0; p; t).
NARAI states that the share of individual i depends on the sum of the claims
of the individuals other than himself. In other words, individuals other than i
cannot a¤ect the share of i by reallocating their claims among themselves, i.e.
the share of individual i is a function of xi; xNni; p; and t:
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No Advantageous Reallocation across States (NARAS): For all (x; p; t); (x0; p; t) 2
D and for all i 2 N , if P
s2S
xis =
P
s2S
x0is such that
P
s2S
(psxis) =
P
s2S
(psx
0
is) and
xjs = x
0
js for all j 2 Nnfig and for all s 2 S, then 'j(x; p; t) = 'j(x0; p; t) for
all j 2 Nnfig.
NARAS implies that if individual i reallocates his claim across all the states
provided that his expected claim remains constant then other individualsshare
(hence his own share) will not change. This axiom becomes compelling when we
want the shares of individuals to be invariant to the distribution of the claims.
Moreover, NARAS has a avor of the standard non-bossy axiom which requires
the shares of all the other agents to remain unchanged if an agent unilaterally
changes his report in a way that does not a¤ect his own share.7
For the remainder of the paper we will consider rich domains, D. Before we
characterize our two rules, namely the ex-post proportional rule and the ex-ante
proportional rule, we characterize a general class of rules that satisfy NARAI,
Anonymity, and Continuity. This class of rules includes both the ex-ante pro-
portional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. Moreover, this class includes
rules like equal split, and non-symmetric proportional rules among others.
Theorem 1 Let jN j  3 and (x; p; t) 2 D. A rationing rule ' satises NARAI,
CONT, and AN if and only if there exists a continuous function Ws : RS 
jSj 1  R+ ! R for all s 2 S such that for all i 2 N we have
'i(x; p; t) =
t
jN j +
X
s2S

xis   xNsjN j

Ws(xN ; p; t)

. (1)
Proof. The "if" part of the statement is obvious. We will prove the "only if"
part. Let (x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, and
AN.
Let x0 = (x1 + x2; 0; x3; :::). Applying NARAI for every individual belonging to
Nnf1; 2g, we get P
i2Nnf1;2g
'i(x; p; t) =
P
i2Nnf1;2g
'i(x
0; p; t). Therefore
'1(x; p; t) + '2(x; p; t) = '1(x
0; p; t) + '2(x
0; p; t): (2)
7Note that the standard non-bossy axioms protect the other individuals from any unilateral
change of report by an individual whereas NARAS axiom protects those individuals only
against a specic change of the report, i.e., the reallocated report with the same expected
value.
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Let x
00
= (x1; xNnf1g; 0; 0; :::). Now we apply NARAI for individual 1. So
'1(x; p; t) = '1(x
00; p; t). This implies
'Nnf1g(x; p; t) = 'Nnf1g(x
00
; p; t): (3)
By (3) and AN, '2(x; p; t) = '1(x2; xNnf2g; 0; :::; 0; p; t):
By (3), '1(x
0; p; t) = '1(x1 + x2; xNnf1;2g; 0; :::; 0; p; t):
By (3) and AN, '2(x
0; p; t) = '1(0; xN ; 0; :::; 0; p; t):
9>=>; (4)
Let us plug (4) into (2) to get
'1(x1; xNnf1g; 0; :::; 0; p; t)+'1(x2; xNnf2g; 0; :::; 0; p; t) = '1(x1+x2; xNnf1;2g; 0; :::; 0; p; t)+
'1(0; xN ; 0; :::; 0; p; t):
Let us dene f : RS+  RS jSj 1  R+ ! R such that
f(xi; xN ; p; t) = '1(xi; xNnfig; 0; :::; 0; p; t)  '1(0; xN ; 0; :::; 0; p; t)
and dene g : RSjSj 1R+ ! R such that g(xN ; p; t) = '1(0; xN ; 0; :::; 0; p; t).
Thus we get
f(x1; xN ; p; t) + f(x2; xN ; p; t) = f(x1 + x2; xN ; p; t): (5)
As it is evident from (5), f is additive in the rst term and by denition
f is continuous (since ' is continuous). So by invoking Cor 3.1.9, p.51, from
Eichhorn (1978), we deduce that f is linear in the rst term, that is, there exists
a continuous function W : RS jSj 1  R+ ! RS such that
f(xi; xN ; p; t) =
P
s2S
[Ws(xN ; p; t)xis] :
So 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)] + g(xN ; p; t):
Summing over i 2 N we getP
i2N
'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xNs)] + jN jg(xN ; p; t) = t.
So g(xN ; p; t) =
t P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ;p;t)xNs)]
jN j .
Hence we get the desired functional form.
'i(x; p; t) =
t
jN j +
P
s2S
h
xis   xNsjN j

Ws(xN ; p; t)
i
, for all i 2 N .
Remark 1 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, and AN are independent. To show
independence of the axioms we provide the following examples:
 'i(x; p; t) = min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

where
P
i2N
min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

= t.
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satises all the axioms except NARAI.
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 'i(x; p; t) =
8<: pri(x; p; t) if
P
s2S
xNs < 2tjSj
epri(x; p; t) o/w .
This rule satises all the axioms except CONT.
 '(x; p; t) = (t; 0; 0; :::; 0) for all (x; p; t) 2 D. This priority rule satises all
the axioms except AN.
The family of rules characterized in the theorem above contains various rules
including proportional and egalitarian rules. In the example below, we provide
some notable rules that belong to this family.
Example 2 Various weight functions Ws(xN ; p; t) give rise to various rules.
Some of the examples are:
 Equal split rule, i.e., 'i(x; p; t) = tjN j ; when Ws(xN ; p; t) = 0.
 When Ws(xN ; p; t) satises
P
s2S
[Ws(xN ; p; t)xNs] = t, we get the family of
proportional rules, i.e., 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[Ws(xN ; p; t)xis].
 When the weight functions are uniform with respect to states, that is,
Ws(xN ; p; t) =
tP
s2S
xNs
for all s, we get 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
xisP
s2S
xNs
t.
 The ex-ante proportional rule, 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
(psxis)P
s2S
(psxNs)
t whenWs(xN ; p; t) =
pstP
s2S
(psxNs)
:
 The ex-post proportional rule, 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S

ps
xis
xNs

t whenWs(xN ; p; t) =
pst
xNs
:
 The family contains non-symmetric proportional rules with respect to
states as well, e.g., 'i(x; p; t) =
xi1
xN1
t whenW1(xN ; p; t) = txN1 ;W2(xN ; p; t) =
W3(xN ; p; t) = ::: = 0 (all the weight is given to state 1).
In Theorem 1 we characterized the family of rules which include both the ex-ante
proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule. We provide characterization
of these rules in Theorems 3 and 4. Before characterizing our two rules, we
present a family of generalized proportional rules in Theorem 2 that satises
NARAI, CONT, and NAN.
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Theorem 2 Let jN j  3 and (x; p; t) 2 D. A rationing rule ' satises NARAI,
CONT and NAN if and only if there exists a continuous Ws : RS  jSj 1 
R+ ! R for all s 2 S such that for all i 2 N , we have
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)] .
Proof. The ifpart is obvious. We will prove the only ifpart. Let (x; p; t) 2
D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, and NAN. First we
establish that NARAI and NAN imply AN. Since ' satises NARAI, we know
from Theorem 1 of Ju et al. (2007) that 'i(x; p; t) must be of the form
'i(x; p; t) = Ai(xN ; p; t) +
X
s2S
W^s(xis; xN ; p; t),
where A : RS+jSj 1R+ ! RN and W^ : R+RS+jSj 1R+ ! RS , and
for all s 2 S, W^s(:; xN ; p; t) is additive. Applying NAN, we get Ai(xN ; p; t) = 0
for all (x; p; t) 2 D. Therefore,
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S
W^s(xis; xN ; p; t),
which ensures that AN is satised.
Thus we know that ' satises the premises of our Theorem 1. Hence, we have
'i(x; p; t) =
t
jN j +
X
s2S

xis   xNsjN j

Ws(xN ; p; t)

.
Now we apply NAN to get the desired functional form of 'i(x; p; t). Take
i 2 N with xis = 0 for all s 2 S. NAN implies that 'i(x; p; t) = tjN j +P
s2S
h
xis   xNsjN j

Ws(xN ; p; t)
i
= 0. Therefore, we must have
P
s2S
[Ws(xN ; p; t)xNs] =
t. Hence we get the desired result, 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)]. Note that
the general functional form of 'i must hold for any problem (x; p; t) 2 D includ-
ing those (x; p; t) 2 D where there exists i 2 N such that xis = 0 for all s 2 S.
Remark 2 For jN j = 2, NARAI is trivially satised. In order to get our char-
acterization, we can use null consistency axiom in a variable population setting
similar to Chun (1988). This axiom states that if an individual i claims zero for
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each state, then shares of the individuals other than i are invariant of whether
individual i is present or not. Notice that this axiom implies NAN. By replacing
NAN with Null Consistency one would obtain the desired characterization.
Remark 3 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, and NAN are independent. To show
independence of the axioms we provide the following examples:
 'i(x; p; t) = min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

where
P
i2N
min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

= t.
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satises all the axioms except NARAI.
 'i(x; p; t) =
8<: pri(x; p; t) if
P
s2S
xNs < 2tjSj
epri(x; p; t) o/w .
This rule satises all the axioms except CONT.
 'i(x; p; t) = tjN j for all i 2 N and for all (x; p; t) 2 D. This equal split rule
satises all the axioms except NAN.
The ex-ante proportional rule allocates the resource to the individuals in pro-
portion to their expected claims. Due to the simplicity of this rule, it is practical
and thus appealing in various scenarios. The key advantage of this rule is that
rather than requiring the planner to have information about the whole distri-
bution of the claims, it su¢ ces for the planner to elicit expected claims. In
many cases, it is impossible for the individuals to know the exact distribution of
their claims beforehand. For example, individuals may not know their precise
claims for some improbable events. They are more likely to know, perhaps from
historical experience, an estimate of their expected claim. In Theorem 3, we
characterize the ex-ante proportional rule by using NARAS in addition to the
axioms of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Let jN j  3, jSj  3, and (x; p; t) 2 D. A rationing rule ' satises
NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS if and only if ' is the ex-ante proportional
rule.
Proof. The if part is obvious. We will prove the only if part. Let
(x; p; t) 2 D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, and
NARAS. Given that ' satises the premises of Theorem 2, we have 'i(x; p; t) =P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)], for all i 2 N .
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Let x0 2 RNS+ such that
P
s2S
xis =
P
s2S
x0is and
P
s2S
(psxis) =
P
s2S
(psx
0
is) and
xjs = x
0
js, for all j 2 Nnfig and for all s 2 S. So we getX
s2S
[ps (xis   x0is)] = 0, for all i 2 N: (6)
By NARAS, we have 'i(x; p; t) = 'i(x
0; p; t), for all i 2 N . Then
X
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)] =
X
s2S
[(Ws(x
0
N ; p; t)x
0
is)] , for all i 2 N: (7)
Fix j 2 Nnfig; by (7) we have P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xjs)] =
P
s2S
 
Ws(x
0
N ; p; t)x
0
js

=P
s2S
[(Ws(x
0
N ; p; t)xjs)].
By the richness of D, we have Ws(xN ; p; t) = Ws(x0N ; p; t), for all s 2 S. By
using (7) we get
X
s2S
[Ws(xN ; p; t) (xis   x0is)] = 0, for all i 2 N: (8)
By (6) and (8), we deduce that p and W are colinear. So for all s 2 S there
exists hs : RS jSj 1  R+ ! R+ such that Ws(xN ; p; t) = hs(xN ; p; t)ps for
all s 2 S. Moreover by NARAS, we must have hs = hs0 for all s0 6= s. To see
this, consider two states, say s and s0 such that hs(xN ; p; t) > hs0(xN ; p; t) for
some (x; p; t) 2 D. In this case, an individual i would have an advantageous
mean preserving reallocation. So we can write hs(xN ; p; t) as h(xN ; p; t).
Summing over i 2 N , P
i2N
P
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)] =
P
i2N
P
s2S
[h(xN ; p; t)psxis] =
h(xN ; p; t)
P
s2S
(psxNs) = t:
So h(xN ; p; t) = tP
s2S
(psxNs)
:And 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[h(xN ; p; t)psxis] =
P
s2S
(psxis)P
s2S
(psxNs)
t,
for all i 2 N .
Remark 4 Note that for jSj = 2, mean preserving reallocation is only possible
when p1 = p2 which makes NARAS ine¤ective to obtain hs = hs0 for all s0 6= s.
One can add SYM to obtain the desired characterization.
Before characterizing the ex-post proportional rule, we note that NARAS is not
satised by the ex-post proportional rule. Figure 4 below illustrates an instance
where NARAS is violated using a two-individual and two-state example where
16
both states are equally likely. Here, individual 2 has a deterministic claim, i.e.,
he claims c2 in both states. Now, if individual 1 also has a deterministic claim
of, say c1, in both states then the nal allocation by the ex-post proportional
rule is given by pr(E(x)). In contrast, suppose individual 1 reallocates his
claims across the two states (as x11 and x12) in such a way that the mean of
the claims is preserved at c1. In this case, the nal allocation by the ex-post
proportional rule is given by E(pr(x)). Clearly, individual 1 is worse o¤ by this
mean-preserving spread and thus NARAS is violated.
Figure 4: Ex-post proportional rule violates NARAS: Under ex-post
proportional rule, mean-preserving spread makes agent 1 worse o¤ when agent
2 has a deterministic claim.
The following examples illustrate that the rest of the axioms in our theorem are
independent as well.
Remark 5 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, NAN, and NARAS are independent.
To show independence of the axioms we provide the following examples:
 'i(x; p; t) = min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

where
P
i2N
min

;
P
s2S
(psxis)

= t.
This ex-ante uniform gains rule satises all the axioms except NARAI.
 'i(x; p; t) =
8><>:
pri(x; p; t) if
P
s2S
xNs < 2tjSjP
s2S
xis
xNs
t o/w
.
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This rule satises all the axioms except CONT.
 'i(x; p; t) = tjN j for all i 2 N and for all (x; p; t) 2 D. This equal split rule
satises all the axioms except NAN.
 'i(x; p; t) = epri(x; p; t). The ex-post proportional rule satises all the
axioms except NARAS.
Now we characterize the ex-post proportional rule. The functional form of
the ex-post proportional rule is additively separable with respect to the states.
This is similar to the expected utility form due to von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). Notice that the lotteries in our framework are analogous to probabilities
of the states, (ps)s2S and the outcomes are given by (xjs; t)s2S . Moreover the
preference of agent i over lottery p 2 jSj 1 is dened by the ordering given by
the rule 'i(x; p; t). Therefore, in the spirit of Expected Utility Theory, we will
utilize the independence axiom which is dened below.
Independence (IND): For all (x; p; t); (x; q; t); (x; r; t) 2 D, for all i 2 N , and for
all  2 (0; 1), we have 'i(x; p; t)  'i(x; q; t) if and only if 'i(x; p+(1 )r; t) 
'i(x; q + (1  )r; t).
IND implies that the ordering of an individuals share with respect to two dif-
ferent state probabilities is preserved if these two state probabilities are mixed
with any other state probability.
The ex-post proportional rule is obtained by rst nding the shares of an indi-
vidual for each state of the world using the proportional rule on the claim prole
in that state and then taking expectation of the shares over all the states. Com-
pared to the ex-ante proportional rule, which is simple and practical in some
settings as we have discussed above, the ex-post proportional rule embodies a
deeper sense of proportionality. This is so because the shares are found by ap-
plying proportional rule for each possible state of the world. Therefore, there is
a strong case for using this rule based on this principle of proportionality if we
are able to compute share of an individual for each possible state of the world.
By adding SYM and IND to the axioms of Theorem 2, we get characterization
of the ex-post proportional rule in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 Let jN j  3, and (x; p; t) 2 D. A rationing rule ' satises NARAI,
CONT, NAN, SYM, and IND if and only if ' is the ex-post proportional rule.
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Proof. The ifpart is obvious. We will prove the only ifpart. Let (x; p; t) 2
D: Let ' be a rationing rule satisfying NARAI, CONT, NAN, SYM, and IND.
Given that ' satises the premises of Theorem 2, we have
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S
[(Ws(xN ; p; t)xis)] , for all i 2 N . (9)
Notice that the number of states is nite. Moreover, given the way we have
dened preferences over lotteries, i.e., as the ordering given by 'i(x; p; t), our
CONT and IND axioms imply that the preferences are continuous in p and sat-
isfy v.N-M Independence axiom. Therefore we can utilize the Expected Utility
Theorem and deduce that 'i is additively separable with respect to probabili-
ties. That is, for all x 2 RNS+ for all p 2 jSj 1, and for all s 2 S there exists
uis : RN+  R+ ! R+ such that
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S

psuis
 
xjs; t

, for all i 2 N . (10)
.
By SYM, we have uis = uis0 for all s; s0 2 S. Therefore we have
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S

psui
 
xjs; t

, for all i 2 N . (11)
.
By (9) and (11) we deduce that for all s 2 S there exists v : R2+ ! R+ such
that
'i(x; p; t) =
X
s2S
[psxisv(xNs; t)] , for all i 2 N . (12)
Consider a degenerate lottery s, that is, x s 2 S and let ps = 1.
So 'i(x; s; t) = xisvs(xN ; t).
Summing over i 2 N , we get P
i2N
'i(x; s; t) =
P
i2N
[xisv(xNs; t)] = v(xNs; t)xNs =
t. So v(xNs; t) = txNs . Hence we get the ex-post proportional rule.
'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
[psxisv(xNs; t)] =
P
s2S

ps
xis
xNs

t.
Remark 6 Our axioms NARAI, CONT, NAN, SYM, and IND are indepen-
dent. To show independence of the axioms we provide the following examples:
 'i(x; p; t) =
P
s2S
(psminfs; xisg) where s is found by
P
i2N
minfs; xisg =
t, for all s. This ex-post uniform gains rule satises all the axioms except
NARAI.
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 'i(x; p; t) =
8><>:
epri(x; p; t) if P
s2S
xNs < 2tjSjP
s2S
xis
xNs
t o/w
.
This rule satises all the axioms except CONT.
 'i(x; p; t) = tjN j for all i 2 N and for all (x; p; t) 2 D. This equal split rule
satises all the axioms except NAN.
 'i(x; p; t) = xi1xN1 t. This non-symmetric rule satises all the axioms except
SYM.
 'i(x; p; t) = pri(x; p; t). The ex-ante proportional rule satises all the
axioms except IND.
5 Conclusion
We study rationing problems where claims are state contingent. We introduce
two extensions of the proportional rules in our framework the ex-ante and the
ex-post proportional rules. Applying the proportional rule to the expected claim
gives the ex-ante proportional rule. The ex-post proportional rule is dened as
the expectation of the shares given by the proportional rule for various states.
To characterize these rules we propose two extensions of No Advantageous Re-
allocation introduced by Moulin (1985). The rst extension, NARAI, requires
that no group of individuals benets if transfers are allowed across individuals
for each state. The second extension, NARAS, implies that an individual cannot
change other individualsshares (hence his own share) by reallocating his claim
across the states while his expected claim is constant.
We characterize the ex-ante proportional rule by NARAI and NARAS combined
with Continuity, and No Award for Null Players. To characterize the ex-post
proportional rule, we borrow Independence axiom from the Expected Utility
Theory. This axiom says that by mixing two lotteries with a third one, the
rationing rule remains una¤ected by the choice of the third lottery. By replacing
NARAS with the Independence Axiom, and adding Symmetry, we obtain the
characterization of the ex-post proportional rule.
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We also compare the shares of the two rules by considering the di¤erence in the
shares of an individual allocated by the two rules as a function of the claim vector
and state probabilities. We have demonstrated the conditions under which the
two rules coincide. It is also shown that an individual with deterministic claim
will prefer the ex-post proportional rule over the ex-ante proportional rule.
This paper leads us to some important issues to be considered for future re-
search. One such issue is to nd axiomatic characterizations of the extensions
of other important rules, such as uniform gains and uniform losses. It will also
be interesting to extend our framework to situations, where the resource itself
is state contingent, and where the individuals have subjective probabilities.
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